The U.S. Pacific Command
Humanitarian Demining Program
Under the direction of the U.S. Pacific Command, SOCPAC guides the deployment of Special Operations Forces to mine-affected countries throughout Asia
and the Pacific to teach clearance and develop indigenous capabilities.
By Joe Lokey, MAIC

T

he focal point for U.S. military
assistance in humanitarian
demining efforts in Asia and
the Pacific Rim is a small, two-person
office in an obscure wing of an old
building on Camp H.M. Smith in
Hawaii. It is from this office that two
members of the Special Operations
Command Pacific (SOCPAC) plan
and coordinate humanitarian
demining training and equipment
donations to Laos, Thailand,
Cambodia and Vietnam.
SOCPAC is a sub-unified
command under the direction of the
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)
and is responsible for activities
covering two-thirds of the Earth's
surface and 15 time zones. The
training teams come from Special
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Forces units both within the Pacific
theater and from units based on the
West Coast of the United States. EOD
personnel from other military units in
the Pacific also augment the reams.
Once they enter a country for a
training mission, they are under the
operational control of SOCPAC,
which coordinates their activities with
rhe host nation's U.S. embassy and
their home units. They are the ideal
capability tO use in this important
initiative because of the unique skills
they develop under Special Operations
Forces (SOF) training.

The Role of Special Forces
Although the humanitarian
demining mission is a collateral
training mission for the Special Forces
teams, it directly and substantially
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benefits their combat skills and
requirements in areas of Foreign
Internal Defense (FlO) and
Unconventional Warfare (UW) . These
unique capabilities and mission casks
led Special Forces ro be chosen to lead
the U.S. effort ro provide this kind of
training and assistance ro other
nations. Not only do benefits accrue
to those being trained, but U.S.
soldiers also receive a substantial
training benefit that increases their
effectiveness.
In this peacetime mission, as in
its wartime task, the role of Special
Forces focuses on using mission related
skills (FIO/UW) tO establish and train
a host nation organization. This occurs
at both the headquarters and
subordinate level, in a range of basic
to
advanced skills such as
communications, field and trauma
medicine, small unit leadership, and
logis t ics support skills . Support
training is also provided in demining
mission planning, as well as demining
and mine awareness teaching
techniques. This is all done with full
cognizance of the U.S. law that
prohibits U.S. forces from entering an
active mine field.
In the execution of these
missions, the benefits to the U.S.
military of deploying Special Forces
teams are clearly obvious. These
deployments benefit the troops in that
they provide: training opporrunities tO
practice mission skills; experience and
familiarity with the cultures in these
countries; an opportunity tO improve
already substantial language skills; and
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the ability to enhance the coordination
and integration of the host nation and
NGOs' involvement in their activities.
These unique SOF skills and the
troops' considerable coalition building
assets make the use of conventional
forces in chis role less effective.

this concept and encouraging the
pursuit of donor support funding, a
long-term solution tO a country's
landmine and UXO problem can be
easily developed and initiated.

The U.S Goal

The SOCPAC role in humanitarian demining, like other U.S.
military involvement, operates to
enhance the regional U.S. military
posture in the Pacific, contribute to
peace and stability in conflict prone
regions, have a positive impact on
critical humanitarian situations
around the Pacific Rim, and foster selfsufficiency and interoperability.

The foundation for the U.S.
humanitarian demining training effort
in the Pacific, and all areas around the
globe, is the focus on eventual selfsufficiency and the use of the "trainthe-trainer" concept. This ensures that
the host nation is fully capable of
creating and sustaining their own
demining teams and the support
infrastructure, sooner rather chan later.
It is through this philosophy in the
Pacific and elsewhere that the United
States encourages host nation
ownership and understanding of their
own experiences and gained
knowledge. This is truly a way ro
ensure that, once fully engaged, a solid
foundation is provided for developing
local solutions to local problems.
By integrating NGO efforts inro
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in-Chief's (CINC) regional
strategy for national and regional
security.
• Improve the readiness and quality
of training for the U.S. military
involvement.

SOCPAC

The goals of SOCPAC:
• Relieve suffering from the adverse
effects of landmines while
promoting U.S. interests.
• Alleviate the threat of landmines
to the innocent.
• Establish sustainable indigenous
demining programs.
• Encourage international cooperation and participation.
• Support the Pacific Commander-
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The U.S. military is specifically
funded for this mission through the
Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and
Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation
provided yearly by Congress. It
provides the transportation, sustainment and equipment needs of the
units conducting the training, and a
limited initial equipment provision
that is donated tO the units being
trained at the conclusion of training.
These missions are coordinated with
the U.S. Department of State, which
provides more equipment and longterm capabilities to aid nations
through the Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related
Activities (NADR) appropriation.
It is the teamwork and coordination among the agencies working to
support a nation, in close cooperation
with the U.S. embassy in that nation,
that makes the U.S. humanitarian

demining program so effective.
Throughout the Pacific, SOCPAC is
recognized as the executive agent for
humanitarian demining assistance and
will coordinate all U.S . assistance to
the following countries that have
entered into a formal agreement with
the U.S. government:
Current Programs

CAMBODIA
T he U.S. assistance and training
program began in June 1994 with an
assessment visit that set the foundation
for mine clearance training and mine
awareness training. This was followed
by the deployment of a 27 -man team
in September of that year. There were
three separate deployments of similar
size and duration every year for the
next few years until the summer of
1997 when operations were suspended
because of the political situation in
Cambodia. An assessment team from
the U.S. Department of Defense
visited Cambodia in February 2001 to
review the situation and determine if
U.S. assistance could be re-engaged.
As a result, the United States is
planning to provide additional
training and support to CMAC in the
areas of medical training, munitions
storage and handling, and vehicle
•

maintenance through 2003. This
follow-on training has begun with the
arrival of a medical training team.
Approximately 50 to 90 people
continue to be killed or injured by
landmines each month in Cambodia.
Current "official estimates" place the
number of mines at approximately 4
million-6 million spread throughout
some 3,600 mined areas identified to
date. These areas are estimated to cover
about 2,900 sq. km. The Cambodian
Mine Action Center (CMAC), an all
civilian insitution, believes that the full
extent of t h e mine problem in
Cambodia is not accurately known.
Mine contamination is spread
throughout the country with heavier
concentrations in the northwestern
provinces. UXO contamination
appears to be moderate to high and
comprises mostly unsophisticated
munitions spread throughout the
country with possibly higher
concentrations in the central, southern
and eastern provinces.
In spite of the heavy focus on
Cambodia by the international
community, it is likely that mine
action operations will need to
continue at the current level by
CMAC for at least the next 5-1 0 years.
Beyond that, it is likely that a reduced
capability will be needed to deal with
smaller or lower priority clearance
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2001.
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tasks and numerous individual mine/
UXO reports- perhaps as long 50
years.
The military engineers of the
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
(RCAF) have been involved in
"demining" (and bomb disposal) since
approximately 1994. Their contribution to the reduction in the mine/
UXO threat has been quite substantial:
according to RCAF data, their troops
have cleared approximately 26 million
sq. m (26 sq. km) and destroyed some
88,000 mines, 46,000 booby traps and
19,000 UXO. Given the magnitude
of the mine/UXO problem in
Cambodia and RCAF's contributions
to date, there is a strong argument to
continue their involvement in mine
and UXO clearance.
Though the use of national
military forces for demining purposes
is not unusual, their involvement in
human itarian and/or external ly
funded mine action activities is
presently contentious or an unpopular
option for some donors. As a
consequence of these sensitivities, the
Uni t ed Nations developed the
"United Nations Mine Action And
The Use Of The Militaries" policy.
This poli cy, which provides clear
guidelines on this issue, was approved
by the Inter-Agency Coordination
Group on Mine Action on 25 January
1999. For other reasons, the U.S.
assistance through both NADR
funding and SOCPAC will not be
through the RCAF, nor will training
activities engage RCAF members.
CMAC will remain the so le
governmental recipient of U.S.
assistance in the foreseeable future.

LAOS
The UXO and mine contamination in Laos led to a request for U.S.
assistance in early 1995. An assessment
team conducted a review of the Lao
situation and the National Security
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Council's Interagency Working Group
(IWG) approved U.S. assistance for a
comprehensive Ordnance Removal
and Community Awareness training
program in October 1995. The
partners in this endeavor with the U.S.
teams were the Ministry of Social
Welfare and U.N. Development
Program (UNDP).
Training of Lao humanitarian
deminers began in 1996 with a
clearance and awareness mission
coordinated by SOCPAC and the
United States. This helped to build
and establish the original training
center at Nam Souang. The Lao teams
assumed responsibility for their own
training in October 1999 after
certification and selection of trainers.
Over 104,000 items of ordnance have
been cleared since the creation of
UXO Lao and over 700 villages visited
with comprehensive mine risk
education messages.
Though U.S. military technical
assistance ended in 1999, UXO Lao
continues to train staff at the National
Training Center at Ban Ylai. Over
1,000 Lao nationals have graduated
with a variety of mine action skills.
UXO Lao is emerging from its
consolidation phase and is moving

into the sustai nm ent phase of its
growth as it seeks to reduce international support and become a fully
indigenous and sustainable operation.
In April of 2000, SOCPAC
conducted a technical assistance visit
to the national Training Center and
UXO Lao National headquarters.
Possible U.S. assistance in the future
will focus on training aids, explosives,
and some smal l unit leadership
tram mg.
Though the mine/UXO problem
in Laos is still large in comparison to
other countries in the region, the
political and security situation in the
country is stable enough for existing
programs to make a significant
difference in the coming years. A small
increase in Hmong rebel activity in the
north does not appea r to have a
landmine aspect to it and the teams
already trained are sufficient to engage
any further threat.

THAILAND
Though Thailand itself has not
been engaged in a major military
conflict for quite some time, the threat
of smaller cross-border insurgencies
and outside conflicts have resulted in
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a significant landmine problem for
Thailand along its borders with four
other neighbors. In 1998, a governmental survey indicated that
approximately 796 sq. km of land can
not be utilized in these border areas,
within which nearly 400,000 people
reside. Of these mined areas, 532 sq.
km are on the Thai-Cambodian
border, 124 sq. km are on the ThaiLao border, 53 sq. km are on the ThaiMyanmar border, and 87 sq. km are
on the Thai-Malaysian border.
The Lao border problem was
primarily the result of the Thai Army
conflict with the Thai Communist
Party that starred in 1964 with both
using landmines as a principle weapon
in a jungle war. The hostilities
concluded in 1989. The problem
along the Malaysian border was the
result of British/Malaysian military
fighting with the Communist Party of
Malaysia (CPM) from the early 1950s
through 1989. The military junta's
repression of minority groups in
Myanmar (Burma) have also led to
increased hostilities and defensive
actions along that border. The greatest
single use of APL and threat to
civi lians exists along the ThaiCambodian border. This legacy

remains from the Khmer Rouge and
other internal insurgencies.
From 1994-99, a total of 2,837
landmines were cleared and destroyed
by the Burapha Field Force in Sa Keao
province. Enhancing existing mine
detection dog (MDD) capacity at Pak
Chong by acquiring, training and
deploying 12 MDDs with handlers.
Four MDDs with handlers are
operational with Unit #1 and 10
additional dogs are undergoing
training at Pak Chong Military Dog
Center. The Asian Disaster
Preparedness Center (ADPC), an
international training center located
on the campus of the Asian Institute
ofTechnology in Bangkok, is working
in partnership with TMAC to increase
mine awareness in Thailand. ADPC
hosted a National Seminar on Mine
Action in December 1999 to
announce the launch of ADPC's
Landmine Awareness Program
(chaired by HRH Princess Galiyani)
to attendees, such as prominent
members of the Royal Thai
Government. As pan of the Landmine
Awareness Program, ADPC coordinates monthly mine awareness
seminars in Sa Keao province.
U.S. assistance began in 1999
with help in establishing a mine action
center in Ratchaburi and a community
mine awareness program centered in
Lop Buri. Several rotations of training
assistance began in August 1999, while
the seventh rotation of these teams
arrived in January 2001. To date, there
have been 300 deminers trained and a
cadre of the selected students assuming
instructor duties to support the live
mine clearance operations which
began in July 2000. It is anticipated
that sustainment rotations will begin
in 2002 with upgrade training and
component course training in specific
skills.

VIETNAM

Other Regional Concerns

Since the Vietnam War ended in
197 5, it is estimated by the
Vietnamese government and foreign
experts that more than 4,000
Vietnamese have been injured and at
least 500 killed in accidents involving
landmines and UXO. U.S. and U.N.
estimates put the number of mines in
Vietnam-a battlefield from rhe
1940s until the 1970s-ar 3.5 million.
The mine/UXO threat is varied
and many of the munitions are dated
and rusted-making many more
sensitive and more dangerous.
Vietnam itself produced as many as 18
types of AP mines in the past, mostly
as copies of U.S. or Eastern Bloc
mines. The only type known to have
been produced in the 1990s is the
"apple mine"- a recycled BLU-24
bomblet. A majority of the heavy
landmine and UXO threat is in and
around Quang Tri province in central
Vietnam
along the former
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between
north and south. Other heavily mined
areas were along rhe Sino-Vietnam
border. While China claims to have
cleared all of its mines from this area,
Vietnam says that it cleared more than
100,000 mines from the border
between 1992-97.
In July of 2000, an assessment
team briefed the U.S. Interagency
Working Group on the Vietnamese
request for U.S. assistance. As a result,
the IWG approved the inclusion of
Vietnam in the U.S. program. The
initial support package is anticipated
to support ongoing demining efforts
by providing equipment worth about
$1.7 million to help mine clearance
and mine action program management efforts. The Vietnamese have a
particular need for assistance with
demining and ordnance clearance in
shallow littoral areas, as well. The U.S.
assistance program is still under
formulation and will commence in the
summer of2001.

There are other landmine plagued
countries in Asia and the Pacific Rim.
At the top of most any list would be
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, the Philippines,
Korea, China, India, Pakistan and
Taiwan. Of course, there are very
specific guide! ines to be met and
procedures to be followed by a country
desiring to receive U.S. humanitarian
demining. In general, U.S. assistance
is predicated on (1) the host nation
submitting a formal request for
assistance through its U.S. Embassy,
(2) hostilities in the country having
ceased and a workable peace
agreement being in place, and (3) the
landmine hazards being clearly
present.
Not all countries that have
requested U.S. assistance have been
approved. Also, the demand for the
highly skilled Special Forces teams in
other areas around the globe is causing
a shortage of qualified trainers rhar
limits the availability of these teams.
In many cases, a periodic assessment
and support team visit, skills upgrade,
quality assurance review and analysis,
or other limited assistance may be all
that can be realistic for any given
request. The decision to support any
country with assistance rests with the
Interagency Working Group (IWG)
co-chaired by the U.S. Departments
of State and Defense.
Other countries in the Pacific also
have significant mine problems but are
either ineligible for U.S. assistance or
have not asked for assistance. In
Myanmar, 10 our of the 14 stares and
divisions are mined and had some
I ,500 landmine victims reported in
1999 alone. In the Karen state, it is
believed that one person is either
injured or killed by a landmine every
day. Information from within the
country is unreliable and what is
known comes from aid organizations
working along the Myanmar-Thailand
border. Myanmar also still manu-
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factures landmines th at are used
regularly by the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC) to
fight the various armed resistance
groups barding with the mili ta ry
regime, including ethnic minority
groups from the Shan, Karen and
Karenni states in rhe east of M yanmar,
and Chin and Arakan stares in the
west. The two most common are
patterned after the Chinese Type 58
blast mine and Type 59 stake mine.
Another key Pacific country with
a significant landmine problem is Sri
Lanka. By the end of 1999, a small
U.N. demining ream in Jaffna
supported by the Australian and
Dutch governments had cleared about
68,500 sq. m of mined land, destroyed
577 APLs and unearthed 42
unexploded devices. Clashes with the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) are increasing and ovenaking
land formerly held and controlled by
gove rnment forces. Meanwhile,
refugees' occupat ion of previously
mined areas is a major humanitarian
concern in a conflict that has killed
65,000 people since 1983. The LTTE
has become adept at using landmines
in addition to weaponry that is often
far more advanced and plentiful than
those used by government forces, as
evidenced by rhe their purchase of
SA14 m issiles from Bulgaria and 60
tons of high explosives from the
Ukraine. The consecutive losses of II
government camps in rhe Wanni in
November 1999 and Elephant Pass in

April 2000 demonstrated that this
conflict is likely to persist for some
ume.
A major new development in
June 2000 occurred with the report of
landmines in rhe Philippines. Guerilla
groups from the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) and the New
People's Army have been employing
landmines against government and
police forces, as have the bandit groups
from the smaller Abu Sayyaf who
kidnapped tourists in 2000. Of major
concern is rhar many of the radical
groups in the Philippines and
Indonesia may be developing
operational ties since a raid on a major
MILF base last July resulted in
Indonesian passports being discovered.
The national army appears to be fully
capable of meeting this threat and it
is not anticipated that the U.S.
government will become actively
engaged in assisting the Philippines in
the near furure. As bilateral military
exercises are conducted annually with
the Philippines, this threat is
recognized and dealt with to ensure
proper awareness and responses are
considered for the safety of all forces.
Ethnic unrest and uncertainty
must continually be watched as small
and poorly armed, bur devoted
insurgency groups seek to instill fear
and respect through the use of cheap
and easily manufactured weapons such
as APLs and other similar improvised
explosive devices (IEDs).
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Police and Islamic activists with
homemade bombs clashed 111
Brahmanbaria, Bangladesh, on
February 6, killing six. A landmine
arrack in Kashmir, India, by the
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba militants killed two
soldiers on February 7. After a
relatively mine-free conflict in East
Timor, Indonesia, ended, the
government there now faces a growing
threat from others looking to follow
as the growing build up in West Papua
is being watched closely.
Finally, the Maoist insurgency has
been growing in Nepal. In September
2000, 14 policemen were killed when
the headquarters in the Dolpa district
were sieged. There were no reports of
APLs or IEDs being used in this
instance, bur the concern remains even
today.
As long as landmines and UXO
hamper post conflict reconstruction,
pose a significant threat to civilians
and cause imernal shifts in refugees in
Asia and the Pacific, there will be a
need for training assistance and
support that is ideally suited to the
skills, experiences and expertise of the
U.S. military units in the Pacific.
When it is called upon to provide this
assistance, SOCPAC will coordinate
and manage irs employment and
program content to ensure that the
highest quality training support and
assistance is given. The end result will
be a sustainable program and an able
host nation capability. •

